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Options and Scenarios for South African Actions Against Its Neighbors

South Africa's economic and military dominance of the region provides it with a broad range of options for actions against its neighbors, many of which it has exercised repeatedly. Pretoria's regional policy under State President P. W. Botha, who came to power in 1978 after 13 years as Defense Minister, has been especially prone to coercive measures, ranging from "economic pinpricks" such as recently restricted supplies of lubricants for Zimbabwean diesels to full-fledged support for Angolan insurgents. This memorandum:

- Provides a menu of South African economic and military options for each of Pretoria's neighbors, with actions listed in order of severity, including the probable impact on the country, the country's probable response, and an estimate, where possible, of the costs to the United States and the West of compensating a country for damage.
- Formulates several scenarios, starting with a baseline assessment, that project Pretoria's probable regional reaction to alternative US and Western initiatives toward South Africa, indicates the options and targets the South Africans are likely to choose, and assesses the impact on US and Western interests.
- Outlines briefly our understanding of the general priorities and factors that affect Pretoria's policies toward its neighbors.

We begin by examining the forces that affect Pretoria's calculus, reflecting our judgment that the evolving crisis inside the country has caused Pretoria to take an increasingly demanding and coercive stance in the region. [REDACTED]

Section I

The View From Pretoria

We doubt that South Africa proceeds within the region from any "grand strategy" but rather believe that leaders in Pretoria react to events and seize opportunities as they present themselves. Nevertheless, the Botha government's decisions on dealing with individual black states appear to fall within a framework of general objectives and priorities. We believe, however, that several key factors, many of them reflecting domestic political conditions, critically affect how Pretoria implements its regional policy. [REDACTED]

Attacking Anti-South African Insurgents. Pretoria's hostility toward a neighbor is directly influenced by the extent to which it supports—or is perceived to support—the African National Congress (ANC), the South-West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO), and the Pan-Africanist

Congress (PAC). Pretoria appears determined to attack these groups' external links, either by forcing its neighbors to crack down on their activities or, as appears to be the case more recently, taking direct action themselves to crush what they see as outside subversives. We believe there is a strong psychological dimension driving this prime objective of South African regional policy: since Pretoria's suspicions about its black neighbors reflect its severe anxieties about its black majority, no independent black state, except possibly Swaziland, can ever do enough to satisfy Pretoria's demands on the ANC issue. Even Botswana's determined, albeit unsuccessful, efforts to eliminate ANC activity within its borders has won it little relief from South African saber rattling, assassination teams, and cross-border raids. The Botha government, moreover, has often played to white concerns—whether over rising domestic unrest, recent ANC attacks, or the "too rapid" pace of reform—by attacking ANC facilities across its borders or punishing its neighbors for their actual or putative support for the ANC. [redacted]

Maintaining Regional Supremacy. Pretoria's profound skepticism about the longer term possibility of peaceful coexistence with neighboring black states, in our judgment, has led it to adopt a second major regional priority: keeping its neighbors—particularly those it regards as most hostile—weak and dependent. Pretoria has maintained its status as the region's superpower by creating instability and dependency throughout southern Africa: by backing insurgencies and dissidents in Angola, Mozambique, Zimbabwe, and Lesotho; by its ready use of economic and transportation leverage to undercut regional efforts to reduce the dependence of black-ruled states on South Africa; and by conducting covert operations, such as the 1982 attack on Zimbabwe's Thornhill Airbase, that preempt challenges to South African power. Pretoria's realpolitik regional policy is reinforced, in our judgment, by a deeply rooted belief that, in order to maintain power over an increasingly restive black majority, Pretoria must demand respectful behavior from its black-ruled neighbors. For example, normally compliant Botswana's close security liaison relationship with South Africa still falls short of Pretoria's desire for a formal security pact. Most white South Africans, including the often prickly State President, also appear particularly sensitive to verbal and diplomatic slights from neighboring countries. We suspect that the ruling Afrikaner's traditional need to show who is "baas" will increasingly be acted out on its black-ruled neighbors as Pretoria's frustration with its inability to suppress domestic unrest grows. [redacted]

The Racial Struggle in South Africa. As our preceding analysis suggests, we believe that white attitudes and perspectives formed during three centuries of white minority rule and now under increasing pressure from the black majority are critical to predicting Pretoria's future regional moves. Some white South Africans undoubtedly remain unrepentant racial supremacists who find the thought of sharing political power—let alone living under a system based on political equality—unthinkable; others clearly recognize that the "numbers" are against them and that whites must move to accommodate black aspirations. White South Africans of all political persuasions, however, have been reared in a society built on racial dominance. Intensified pressure from growing black unrest and deepening international isolation, in our view, will sharpen divisions among whites, strengthen polarizing tendencies that fuel both rightwing extremism and white emigration, and cause Pretoria to follow more reactive, emotional, and seemingly irrational foreign policies. The growing siege mentality in Pretoria reinforces the independent Afrikaners' traditional preference for a "go-it-alone" strategy and is likely to bring a more unconstrained transference of white anxieties and impulses into harsh actions against its black neighbors. [redacted]

Attitude Toward the West. In this climate, the white South Africans' long-held love-hate relationship with the West is likely to intensify. On the one hand, whites identify with the Western, Christian, and democratic values, often pointing with pride to particular parallels between their country and the United States. On the other hand, they strongly resent Western opposition to apartheid, frequently dismissing it as hypocritical meddling in their internal affairs. Nevertheless, we believe that the Botha government has often recognized the tactical utility of cooperating with the West, such as when Pretoria shifted from its tough, coercive posture in 1982 and most of 1983 to its participation in early 1984 in US-brokered diplomatic accords with Mozambique and Angola. However, these periods of relative amity—when concerns over possible Western reaction have sometimes restrained Pretoria's hand with its neighbors—usually have been short lived. As unrealistic South African expectations about the West's tolerance for apartheid are dashed in the wake of Western public reaction to a new outburst of domestic turmoil, Pretoria has tended to swing drastically in the other direction, adopting a defiant, hostile, anti-Western stance. In this mode, South Africa has often appeared intent on attacking its neighbors to spite the West, rather than simply in spite of Western reaction. [REDACTED]

South Africa—Deep in the Laager. Our reading of the principles and factors affecting South Africa's regional policy suggests that Pretoria is now on an increasingly harsh tack against its neighbors—even in the absence of further "Western provocations" (that is, sanctions) or "Western meddling" (that is, initiatives). Despite its imposition in June of a nationwide state of emergency and the estimated detention of well over 5,000 black activists and leaders, domestic unrest shows no signs of abating. ANC attacks are increasing, becoming more indiscriminate, and beginning to claim white casualties. At the same time, Pretoria must contend with political challenges from an increasingly strident white right wing and harsher antiapartheid rhetoric from South African blacks and neighboring states. South Africa feels pressed on all sides at home. Last year's imposition of limited sanctions by the United States and the politically inspired run on the rand that forced Pretoria to declare a debt moratorium provoked a new wave of hostility toward the West and the United States in particular. In our judgment, these trends are likely to persist and all suggest that Pretoria will choose liberally from its broad list of economic and military options for attacks on its neighbors.
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
Section II

South African Economic and Military Options Against Its Neighbors

South Africa's range of economic and military options is organized by country and ordered roughly by degree of severity. For each option, in a series of text tables that follow, we have estimated its impact on the recipient and the likely response that the affected country may take.¹ In some cases, where practical, we have tried to gauge what it might cost the West to take remedial action; largely through direct compensation. We have not attempted an assessment of US choices in the face of each South African option since they range from public condemnations through various partial compensation measures to replacement in full, a subject too complex and unwieldy to be treated in these tables. [redacted]

¹ We recognize that South Africa has numerous small economic options—"economic pinpricks" as it were—that are primarily aimed at irritating the recipient without inflicting significant damage. These measures are subsumed within broader categories. Such measures include delaying or misrouting rolling stock, special lubricants, and jet fuel. [redacted]

Figure 1
South African Options Against Selected Economic and Military Targets




Zimbabwe

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South African Options	Impact on Zimbabwe	Possible Zimbabwean Response	Cost to US/West
Economic (S)	Moderate Loss of South African imports, 20% of the total, would cripple import intensive industries and sharply reduce manufactured goods for export.	Few alternatives. Most imported goods could be obtained elsewhere, but transport and finance would be problematic. No market other than South Africa for most manufacturing exports.	Up to \$200 million to replace lost earnings.
Reduce or end transshipments through South Africa.	Severe. Nearly 95% of Zimbabwe's overseas trade is transported through South Africa, including goods shipped through Maputo. Near shutdown of manufacturing because of shortages of imported raw materials.	Few alternatives. Could expand the Beira line or rehabilitate the Chicalacala-Maputo line. Could handle only 50% of Zimbabwe's trade, if returned to full capacity, and would still be subject to attacks by Mozambican insurgents.	Up to \$1.2 billion to replace lost export revenues.
Military (S/N)	"Surgical" attacks with some collateral and civilian loss. Strengthen elements advocating more aid to ANC.	Remove ANC to avoid attacks or allow ANC to operate more freely, despite consequences.	Cost of maintaining present Zimbabwian troops in Mozambique is \$15 million a month.
Agent or small/covert commando attacks on ANC targets.	Greater collateral and civilian loss. May be viewed as direct attack on Zimbabwe.	Same as above; appeal to West and Soviet Bloc for military aid.	Estimated less than \$10 million in supplies for repair, possible provision of portable generators.
Large/overt South African raid on ANC targets.	Severe, if accompanied by cutoff of transshipment through South African routes.	Try to repair and defend incountry facilities; send additional troops to guard Beira corridor; seek economic and military aid from West and Soviet Bloc.	Up to 20,000 b/d of refined petroleum products, over \$100 million a year.
Command attacks on selective economic targets.	Sabotage rail and road links to Zambia and Mozambique.	Vastly complicate security situation, strain Army resources.	Redeploy troops from Mozambique, try to crush revolt; seek additional arms from West and Soviet Bloc.
Sabotage electric power facilities at Hwange and Kariba.	Likely intermittent or temporary power outages, possible severe cuts in industrial capacity if Kariba damaged severely.	Force Kariba into confrontation with South Africa.	Call for immediate and large-scale aid from West and Soviet Bloc; provide more active aid to ANC.
Sabotage oil storage tanks at Nujale, and oil pipeline from Beira.	Severe fuel shortages leading to transport and industrial cutbacks.		
Aid antigovernment dissidents in Matabeleland, insertion of South African-trained dissident teams.	Vastly complicate security situation, strain Army resources.		
Covert/overt operations against Zimbabwean military installations	Force Kariba into confrontation with South Africa.		

Figure 2
Selected Economic and Military Targets Vulnerable to South African Attack




Mozambique

South African Options	Impact on Mozambique	Possible Mozambican Response	Cost to US/West
Economic (C-9)			
Reduce or end electric service to Maputo.	60% of Maputo's electricity is supplied by South Africa's Electricity Supply Commission (ESCOM).	Absorb the loss. Maputo has some antiquated generating facilities that could provide some relief. Insurgent disruption prevents repair and use of lines from Cahora Bassa Dam that could provide an alternative to ESCOM.	
Expel the 150,000 workers legally employed in South Africa	Small. Maputo imports \$63 million in food, oil, minerals from South Africa. Exports only \$7 million, mostly shrimp and minerals.	Absorb the loss. Trade is diversified. All goods are supplied in greater quantity by other trading partners, such as US, Spain, France, and USSR, but at a greater cost.	At least \$40 million to make up for lost remittances.
Military (S-8)			
Agent of small/covert commando attacks on ANC targets	"Surgical" attacks with some collateral and civilian loss.	Remove ANC to avoid attacks or allow ANC to operate more freely, despite consequences.	
Large/covert raid on ANC targets	Greater collateral and civilian loss.	Same as above, plus consider abrogating nonaggression pact with South Africa.	
Sabotage of shipping at Mozambique ports Maputo, Beira, and Nacala	Severe, if accompanied by a refusal to tranship goods through South Africa. Alternative links are very limited in capacity and would be very costly. Possible severe cut in region's export and import trade.	Further disruption to economy already in state of collapse; blackouts and growing isolation of cities would spread fear.	
Resume substantial aid to Mozambican insurgents (RENAMO)	In near-to-mid-term, could accelerate RENAMO gains, further economic contraction, and threaten regime survival.	A appeal for more Zimbabwean troops; reluctantly divert some forces from counterinsurgency to defend facilities, possibly abrogate nonaggression pact with South Africa.	A appeal to neighbors, West, and goods via Dar es Salaam, request Western and Soviet assistance.
Airstrikes on air defense sites, Maputo Airbase, even armored division near South African border.	Moderate casualties and damage to installations and civilian property nearby, possible Soviet or Cuban adviser casualties.	Ask Soviets to replace losses and to increase air defense assistance.	Cost of matching current Soviet bloc and would include replacing 2,000 Soviet Bloc military advisors and \$200,000 in annual Soviet military aid.
Conventional show of force along border, incitement brief and shallow conventional incursion	Greatly alarm Maputo, spark coup against President Michel by military officers seeking reconciliation with RENAMO and South Africa; request increased Soviet military assistance and possibly Cuban combat forces.	Cost of replacing equipment destroyed in a hypothetical airstrike on Maputo Airbase (2 MiG-17 fighters, 5 Mi-8 and 10 Mi-25 helicopters, and 2 SA-3 sites) might total \$80 million.	Redeploy more forces now combatting RENAMO to border; plead for US/West to restrain South Africa; request increased Soviet military assistance and possibly Cuban combat forces.

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Figure 3
South African Options Against Selected Economic and Military Targets



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Botswana

South African Options	Impact on Botswana	Possible Botswana Response	Cost to US/West
Economic (C/NF)			
Reduce or end electricity supplies.	Moderate. The Electricity Supply Commission (ESCOM) provides about 40% of Botswana's electric supply.	Absorb the loss. New generating capacity is coming on line, but it is not sufficient to cover loss.	
Expel the 19,000 Botswana miners working in South Africa.	Moderate. Only 2.5% of population and provides less than 1% of GNP.	No options. Local unemployment is high.	About \$3 million to replace lost remittances.
Reduce or end transport links to South Africa.	Moderate. Only 25% of exports are dependent on South African transport.	Few alternatives. 12% of exports are perishable and must be shipped in refrigerated cars. All cars belong to South African Customs Union.	At least \$50 million to replace lost export revenues.
Reduce or end revenues from Southern African Customs Union.	Moderate. These revenues account for about 20% of the government's total annual revenue.	Few alternatives. Would seek loans or grants from the West.	About \$100 million to replace lost customs revenues.
Reduce or end trade links.	Severe. South Africa provides over 150,000 metric tons of food to Botswana. All oil, about 3,000 barrels per day, comes from South Africa.	No options. All goods would have to come through a third country that would also face the same problems. Alternative rail lines already near capacity.	Transport of 500 tons of food and 3,000 barrels of oil per day.
Military (S/NF)			
Agent or small/covert commando attacks on ANC targets.	"Surgical" attacks with some collateral and civilian loss.	Remove ANC to avoid attacks or allow ANC to operate more freely, despite consequences.	
Large/overt raid on ANC targets.	Greater collateral and civilian loss.	Same as above; appeal for assistance and protection from international community.	
Sabotage ferry at Kazungula.	Significant northern transport link between Botswana and Zambia.	Appeal for Western assistance to replace ferry.	Less than \$100,000.
Sabotage coal-fired power plants at Morupule.	Would increase dependence on electricity supplied by South Africa.	Appeal for Western economic assistance to rebuild. Try to develop power links with Zimbabwe.	

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Lesotho

South African Options	Impact on Lesotho	Possible Lesotho Response	Costs to US/West
Economic (C NF) Reduce or end transport links to South Africa.	Severe. Lesotho is completely surrounded by South Africa. Nothing can flow in or out without South African acquiescence.	None. Few alternatives. Would seek loans or grant from the West.	At least \$50 million to replace lost export revenues.
Reduce or end revenue from the Southern African Customs Union (SACU).	Severe. These revenues are about 60% of the government's yearly total.	Severe. 95% of Lesotho's imports come from South Africa. All exports are either sold to or must be shipped through South Africa.	At least \$85 million.
Reduce or end trade ties.		Severe. These workers remit nearly \$250 million annually, or about one-half of GNP.	At least \$250 million to replace lost foreign exchange revenue.
Military (S NF)	Expel the nearly 150,000 Basotho legally employed in South Africa.	"Surgical" attacks with some collateral and civilian loss.	Evict remaining ANC members.
			[REDACTED]


Swaziland

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South African Options	Impact on Swaziland	Possible Swaziland Response	Costs to US/West
Economic (C NF) Expel the 14,000 Swazi miners working in South Africa.	Moderate. Remittances from miners account for 5% of GNP.	Few alternatives. Exports theoretically could be increased to make up the loss, but most would have to transit South Africa.	About \$50 million in lost remittances.
Reduce or cut oil supplies.	Severe. All of Swaziland petroleum comes from South Africa. Swaziland imports over 800,000 barrels per year.	Few alternatives. Might be possible to ship oil overland from Maputo, but would be subject to attacks by South African-backed Mozambican insurgents.	Cost of transporting 2,000 barrels per day.
Reduce or cut transport links to South Africa.	Severe. 90% of Swaziland's imports and 20% of exports are shipped through South Africa.	Few alternatives. Rail line to Maputo is closed. All Swazi rolling stock is leased from South African Transport Service.	At least \$50 million in lost revenue.
Reduce or suspend revenues from South African Customs Union (SACU).	Severe. SACU revenue accounts for 60% of revenues or about \$100 million per year.	None. Few employment opportunities in local economy.	\$100 million.
Military (S NF) Agent or small/covert commando attacks on ANC targets.	"Surgical" attacks with some collateral and civilian loss.	Give assurances of adhering to existing security agreement with Pretoria. Evict remaining ANC members.	
Occupy Swazi/Mozambique border "Cordon Sanitaire."	South Africans would use territory to attack targets in Mozambique.	Swaziland probably acquiesced.	

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Figure 4
South African Options Against Selected Economic and Military Targets



Zambia

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South African Options	Impact on Zambia	Possible Zambian Response	Cost to US/West
Economic (C NF)	Moderate. Trade is not large, but mining sector depends on imports of spare parts, and transport sector relies on South African -leased freight cars and locomotives.	Few alternatives. Many of the mining parts are unique and would be difficult to obtain elsewhere. Alternate sources of railroad equipment not readily available.	Less than \$10 million unless shortages of spare parts caused mining cutbacks.
Reduce or end trade ties.	Significant. Two-thirds of Zambia's imports and one-third of its exports are transported through South Africa.	No alternative. Little or no excess capacity on alternative transport links.	About \$300 million to make up for lost export revenues.
Military (S NF)	"Surgical" attacks with some collateral and civilian loss. Would underscore Zambia's limited security capabilities.	Remove ANC/SWAPO to avoid attacks or allow ANC/SWAPO to operate more freely, despite consequences.	
Agent or small/covert commando attacks on ANC/SWAPO targets.	Greater collateral and civilian loss. Would further discredit security forces.	Same as above, plus possible appeal for Western and Soviet Bloc military aid.	
Large/overt raid on ANC/SWAPO targets.	Moderate casualties and damage to economic infrastructure. Further deterioration of economy.	Appeal for large increases in Western and Soviet Bloc military and economic aid.	
Commando attacks on selected economic targets, such as rail lines, oil refinery, bridges, mines.	Extensive collateral and personnel losses. Zambian economy would probably collapse if combined with cutoff of transshipments through South Africa.	Same as above.	Provide emergency economic aid and concessionary rescheduling or cancellation of \$4-5 billion in debt to Western countries.
More comprehensive cover/overt attacks, including air strikes. Cut off rail and roads links to port at Dar es Salaam, hit air defense sites, airbases, military garrisons.	In midterm, would further economic contraction and severely strain Zambian military.	Redirect scarce budget resources from other sectors to military expenditures. Seek additional arms and advisers from the West or Soviet Bloc.	
Provide arms and training for Zambian dissidents.			

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Tanzania


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South African Options	Impact on Tanzania	Possible Tanzanian Response	Cost to US/West
Economic (C/NF)			
None likely.			
Military (S/NF)			
Agent or small/covert commando attacks on ANC targets	"Surgical" attacks with some collateral and civilian loss.	Unlikely to expel ANC; defiant condemnation of South Africa.	
Large/overt commando raid on ANC camp in southwest (attacking overland from Malawi) or on ANC offices/camps near coast (by helicopters or speedboats from naval ship).	Greater collateral and civilian loss.	Might request additional air defense equipment, naval craft, military training from PRC or Soviet Bloc; potentially strained relations with Malawi even if Lilongwe not willing accomplice.	
Cross-border raid by Mozambican insurgents on Tanzania's Nachingwea base, used to train Mozambican soldiers.	Significant casualties and damage to base; alarm civilians near southern border.	More border patrols; possibly authorize counterguerrilla sweeps shallow distance into Mozambique; move training site northward.	
Airstrike on ANC camp or Tazara Railroad.	Extreme range allows only small bomb load unless raiders refuel in Malawi; Tazara Railroad is only alternative to dependence on South African railways.	Redeploy some air defense forces; request increased military aid from PRC or Soviet Bloc.	
			[REDACTED]

Malawi

South African Options	Impact on Malawi	Possible Malawian Response	Cost to US/West
Economic (C/NF)	Severe. All imports and exports come through South Africa via links in the region to South Africa.	Few alternatives. The rail line from Malawi to Nacala in Mozambique is currently closed. Northern corridor route through Tanzania is unreliable, including 95% of petroleum.	Up to \$100 million to replace lost export revenues, plus, at least, the cost of providing 2,500 barrels of oil per day.
Military (S/NF)	Malawi does not harbor the ANC and maintains friendly diplomatic relations with Pretoria, which would be unlikely to direct military action against Lilongwe.	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]

Figure 5
South African Options Against Selected Economic and Military Targets



Angola

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
South African Options	Impact on Angola	Possible Angolan Responses	Cost to US/West
Economic (C NF) Angola is not linked to South Africa economically and is not subject to measures such as trade dislocation.	Continue present levels of support for UNITA, including military intervention to stave off major losses.	War continues, with neither Luanda nor UNITA achieving decisive advantage in short term.	
Military (S NF) Angola is not linked to South Africa economically and is not subject to measures such as trade dislocation.	Increased unilateral commando raids on key military targets, seaports, and transportation links; may include raids on ANC facilities in Luanda area.	Temporary military impairment; Angolan Government becomes more jittery.	May request additional weapons or personnel from the Soviets and Cubans.
	Serious raids on oil production facilities onshore or offshore in Cabinda and northwestern Angola.	Potentially severe, depending on scale of raids; companies may curtail operations.	Call for additional Soviet and Cuban military support; consider attacks on South African bases in Namibia; request Soviet financial assistance and credits to compensate for lost oil revenues.
	Direct air and ground support for UNITA offensive operations against specific Angolan bases in the south; little attempt to cover involvement.	Local defeats for Angolan forces; direct confrontation with South Africa likely; UNITA makes limited territorial gains.	Acquiesce in greater Soviet and Cuban control of war; seek more sophisticated Soviet weapons and Cuban troops; counterstrikes on South African bases in Namibia.
	Major invasion of southern Angola; regular ground and air forces strike main garrisons and key logistic links.	Full conventional war; Luanda faces loss of southern part of country.	Request substantial increase in Soviet military assistance and major Cuban troop augmentation; counterstrikes on South African bases in Namibia.

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Zaire

South African Options	Impact on Zaire	Possible Zairian Response	Cost to US/West
Economic (C NF) Victim of reduced or terminated transport and trade links in the region to South Africa.	Moderate to severe. Over 40% of Zaire's annual mineral exports are shipped through South Africa. Three-fourths of the food, fuel, and chemicals used in the southern mining region are imported from South Africa.	Few options in event of prolonged or extensive curtailment of transport and trade in the region. Alternate transportation routes would be unable to handle substantial increases in volume. Some exports and imports could be rerouted, but at sharply increased costs.	Up to \$800 million to replace lost export earnings in the first year, if no exports could be rerouted quickly. Total cost to the economy in the first year would be even higher because the increased cost of transportation will affect imports as well as exports, and production over the longer term.
Military (S NF)	None likely; South Africa and Zaire share several regional objectives, especially support for UNITA insurgents in Angola.	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]

Figure 6
Major Transportation Links in Southern Africa



Section III

Scenarios

Our scenarios for probable South African actions toward its neighbors begin with a baseline scenario, namely our reading of a South Africa deep in the *laager* and girding itself for fairly strong sanctions. The scenario briefly sketches the principal factors affecting Pretoria's regional policies, provides a tactical assessment of those options Pretoria is likely to or could take, and evaluates their implications for US and Western interests. We then provide three additional scenarios intended to gauge differences in probable South African reactions to alternative US/Western initiatives to South Africa:

- In the event the United States and the European Community adopt limited sanctions, South Africa's reaction may be relatively restrained, limited to some economic muscle flexing. The passage of only limited sanctions might reawaken Pretoria to the benefits of tactical cooperation with the West, possibly having a moderating impact on its dealings with its neighbors.
- In the event that the United States imposes strong unilateral sanctions, while the United Kingdom and the EC adopt only a limited package, South Africa's ire probably will be reflected in anti-US actions, both at its presence in South Africa and at countries involved in US initiatives.
- In the event that the United States and its allies develop a comprehensive package that combines limited sanctions and positive programs reaching out to black South Africans and the black-ruled states in southern Africa, we believe that South Africa's resentment over Western interference and attempts to reduce Pretoria's regional supremacy will overwhelm its relief at escaping strong sanctions, leading Pretoria to exercise options that would undermine new Western initiatives. [REDACTED]

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Scenario I: Baseline Projection— South Africa Deep in the Laager

South Africa's Perspective and Response	Pretoria's Actions	Implications for the US and the West
<p>From Pretoria's perspective, we believe the South Africans currently expect harsh new sanctions and are already acting as if they had been passed. Consequently:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">— Pretoria is defiantly gearing its regional policy to unfolding domestic events, relatively unfettered by concern about the Western response.	<p>We would expect Pretoria to:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">— Take limited moves against selected, high-visibility targets that will carry the message that more punishing moves are in the offing if the offending nations fail to cooperate.— Strike harder at selected ANC targets throughout the region. These operations may be similar to the coordinated raids carried out last May against Zimbabwe, Zambia, and Botswana, but are likely to result in more casualties. At the same time, Pretoria is likely to step up its covert campaign against ANC militants.	<p>In our judgment, this scenario would:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">— Provоке shriller international condemnation of the West's refusal to impose economic sanctions.— Strengthen the view in many countries that the time for "negotiations" and "dialogue" on South Africa is now past.— At the same time, probably produce a quiet sigh of relief in some neighboring countries that they escaped Pretoria's retaliation for sanctions; nevertheless, most will publicly condemn Western inaction and some may limit Western access.— Produce opportunities for Soviets to score propaganda points. The Soviets also are likely to increase military sales and advisory assistance to Zimbabwe, Botswana, and Zambia.
<p>In its regional policy, we expect Pretoria would:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">— Strike when it feels necessary at ANC targets throughout the region.— Periodically exercise its economic muscle to indicate to its neighbors the high cost of getting out of line.	<p>South Africa also could:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">— Often act to reassure skittish whites that the government is still in control.— Continue to express a willingness to negotiate "realistic solutions" to regional issues.	<ul style="list-style-type: none">— Expand covert aid to dissident groups in Angola, Mozambique, and Zimbabwe.— Sabotage selected non-ANC targets in neighboring states.
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Scenario II: US and European Community Adopt Limited Sanctions

South Africa's Perspective and Response	Pretoria's Actions	Implications for the US and the West
<p>From Pretoria's perspective, we believe a limited sanctions package would be seen as:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> — At least a temporary reprieve for Pretoria because it expected more drastic action. — Perhaps a recognition that limited cooperation with the West could "win them more time" and provide "tactical maneuvering room." <p>In its regional policy, we expect Pretoria would:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> — Continue current regional policy but might gradually begin to take Western concerns into consideration when making specific decisions. 	<p>We would expect Pretoria to:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> — Apply selective and limited economic retaliatory measures—such as temporary restrictions on rail links or limited embargoes—to show defiance of Western measures (likely targets: Botswana, Zimbabwe). — Shift slightly from saber-rattling rhetoric and high-visibility attacks to smaller scale covert operations against ANC facilities (all surrounding states with an ANC presence remain targets). — Hold out the carrot of increased economic assistance to neighbors, such as Mozambique and Lesotho, who move forcefully against ANC. 	<p>In our judgment, a limited sanctions package probably would:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> — Bring some improvement in Pretoria's relations with the US in the West. — Provoke a new wave of rhetoric from some Frontline states and other African countries that limited sanctions are not even an adequate "first step" and demands for immediate and harsher action against Pretoria. — Cause no major changes in regional relationships, continued dependence on Western aid. — Express a renewed willingness to "consider" and "discuss" regional issues such as Namibian independence and renew security dialogue with neighbors.

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Scenario III: Strong Unilateral US Sanctions, Limited European Community Sanctions

South Africa's Perspective and Response	Pretoria's Actions	Implications for the US and the West
<p>From Pretoria's perspective, we believe strong US sanctions and relatively weak EC sanctions would be seen as:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">— Yet a further sign of betrayal from the US and confirmation that nothing Pretoria does will satisfy Washington.— An ominous trend that other nations probably will follow.	<p>We would expect Pretoria to:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">— Take specific bilateral actions designed to express Pretoria's dissatisfaction with US policy; seek to reduce US diplomatic presence, severely curtail official visits and government-to-government contacts; possibly target known US contacts in black communities.— Try to force the US to make good on commitments by squeezing neighbors such as Botswana and Mozambique.	<p>In our judgment, a comprehensive US sanctions package combined with a limited EC package would:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">— Severely restrict US access inside South Africa.— Produce strong approval from Frontline and other African states, but create expectations of greater US economic assistance to offset impact of retaliatory South African actions.— Create additional international pressure on EC states to follow suit.
<p>In its regional policy, we expect Pretoria would:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">— Make only minor adjustments to current regional policy, continuing to strike at the ANC when it believes necessary.— Attempt to demonstrate that Pretoria, not Washington, is the major power in the region.— Publicly test US leverage and willingness to become involved in the region by striking at countries linked closely to the US.	<p>South Africa also could:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">— Target specific US economic interests such as US oil facilities in Angola.— Underscore limited US diplomatic leverage by moving toward unilateral declaration of independence in Namibia and scuttling the Nkomati accord with Mozambique.— Launch a disinformation campaign designed to embarrass the US or expose US covert activities in the area.	<p>— Produce at least temporary setbacks to Soviet propaganda efforts, but continue opportunities for arms sales and advisory assistance.</p>
<p>Work to undermine US diplomatic efforts in the region.</p>		

**Scenario IV: Comprehensive Alliance Package
(Limited Sanctions and Positive Program)**

South Africa's Perspective and Response	Pretoria's Actions	Implications for the US and the West
From Pretoria's perspective, we believe a comprehensive package that included limited sanctions and a positive program reaching out to South African blacks and the neighboring black states would be seen:	We would expect Pretoria to: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> — Move quickly to undercut US or Western efforts to expand or initiate domestic assistance programs. Actions could include denying access to official assistance personnel, demanding that all aid be channeled through Pretoria and harassing local groups receiving assistance. — Move to undercut US or Western regional assistance programs. Actions could include transportation slowdowns, deporting foreign workers, reduced access to electric power, or selective embargoes on goods imported from South Africa. 	In our judgment, a program of limited sanctions and a positive program would: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> — Over time, feed Pretoria's resentment of US-led Western "meddling" in the region and likely evoke a South African response similar to the imposition of strong US sanctions. — Result in black African condemnation of Western failure to adopt strong sanctions, despite prospects of positive initiative. Reflects likely Frontline states skepticism that comprehensive alliance package will bring an end to white minority rule. — Likely reduce Western leverage and produce more Soviet opportunities for increased military ties in reaction to Western inability to stave off expected South African retaliation.
— With anger that outsiders once again were "meddling" in South African affairs.		
— As an attempt by the West to undermine what Pretoria sees as one of its greatest strengths—its regional hegemony.		
— With limited relief that Pretoria once again had dodged comprehensive sanctions.		
In its regional policy, we expect Pretoria would:		
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> — Attempt to teach its neighbors that Western initiatives aside, South Africa is, and intends to remain, the dominant regional power. — Use its regional economic muscle to reassure whites and make clear to blacks inside South Africa that Pretoria cannot be shaken even if forced to "go it alone." — Take a more aggressive regional stance, probably intensifying attacks on ANC and other targets. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> — Increase direction/support of insurgent and dissident groups in neighboring countries with intention of fostering instability and undermining Western initiatives. — Engage directly in selected economic sabotage designed to highlight the vulnerability of assistance projects.